What about the Oppressors?

                     In the course of our readings so far we have gained insight on the characteristics of oppression. Among those, we now have a more concrete understanding of who occupies the bird cage—in other words, who or what actually constitutes the subject of oppression. The insight presented by Frye recognizes that the subject of oppression is not simply the individual, but a group. An individual is oppressed because of membership in a category of people. Oppression does not impose itself singularly with focus on a particular, but imposes itself on a macroscopic level. The entire point of Frye’s essay is, practically, to show that oppression is a macroscopic phenomenon—of systematically operational forces.  A single wire does nothing, but a number of them can create a cage.

                Oddly, after all the insight we have gained, we have not learned much about who or what constitutes the group we call the oppressors.  This seems a natural question to ask in light of Frye’s observation, but is a more difficult question to answer.

                What is the common ground that forms such a group? Those who benefit from the existence of the oppression? This hardly seems a satisfactory answer as we know many who benefit from oppression do not desire to oppress, and many of these beneficiaries actually fight against it. To me, the most obvious mutual trait consists in contributing to the perpetuation of a system of oppression. For how could we call someone who does not oppress an oppressor? Yet, this attribute seems insufficient as well. Often, the very same people who experience oppression contribute to that oppression, and it seems an error to call the oppressed their own oppressor. (For this blog, I am disregarding those who clearly advocate oppression since it is obvious they should be included in group, but that they by no means comprehensively constitute the group. )

                This issue of who constitutes the group of oppressors left me guessing for some time. Perhaps, it is that I am asking the wrong question. Perhaps it is the case that there is not clearly defined group who oppresses; there are only oppressive structures perpetuated by societal customs and norms. This would account for how the oppressed can oppress themselves (e.g. they practice norms which perpetuate their own disadvantage… possibly in ignorance or holding the view that such practices  are natural).

                Though I find this idea compelling, I also find issue with it from an ethical perspective. In order for people to see the error of their ways, they must feel morally accountable for their contributions to such systems. In other words, there must be something that prompts individuals to reflect on their actions. This is a problem. From a motive standpoint, it is my belief that very few people act with the intent of bring others down as group (i.e. purposefully oppressive with full awareness of their actions). However, it is hard to find moral responsibility without motive involved. For if we decide that it is only the result of their action that contains moral worth, any non-rational being or inanimate object would be fair game in an account of moral responsibility. Motive/intent requires the imposition of someone’s will, which makes them accountable.

                So how do we reconcile this view of moral accountability, a general lack of malicious intent, and the fact that oppression still exists in force? My proposed answer is to hold people accountable for their ignorance. That is, hold them accountable for a lack of intent to be aware of the scope of their behaviors. Is a lack a intent comparable to an actually intent? I do not think so, but we have assumed that oppression is perpetuated in norms and the only way to break norms is show people how their ignorance blinds them to effects of such norms.