Movies

Of the mere 120 movies available under the "Gay and Lesbian" category on Netflix, maybe 5 or 6 are about people of any minority, one or two of which are foreign films. Most of the films are low budget, and some appear to be border line pornographic. Despite the fact that people are more accepting of those who stray more than ever before from the heteronormative way of life, our taste in movies does not reflect this.The fact that big production companies are not making movies about LGBTQ people or their relationships is interesting. Do they think people will not pay to see these movies? Many popular movies (Friends with Benefits, Mean Girls, Easy A) have included gay couples or a gay friend, but always on the side, never the main character(s). Why is this so different and why is this more amusing and acceptable than placing a gay person as the main character?
 I think that because, while everyone wants to say they are "fine" with LGBT people, the thought of watching them on a big screen for two hours makes them uncomfortable. To test this, I asked a heterosexual Caucasian friend if she would go see a movie where the main character was a gay white woman looking for love. She said "probably not," and I asked why she wouldn't. She told me it was because she would have nothing in common with the plot, and would probably not enjoy it as much. Why would she want to watch a movie about someone with interests that did not match her own? At first her reply made sense, but then I began thinking of all the other movies I know she's watched. She's seen all the heteronormative movies I listed above, but she has also seen Gravity (a movie in which Sandra Bullock is cut loose in space), Taken (a movie in which Liam Neeson saves his children from an abductor), and she watches Law and Order every day. Does she have anything in common with the people in these productions? The only similarity is that they're all heterosexuals. My friend claims she has nothing against LGBT people, and I believe her, but the fact that she is willing to watch essentially anything but a "gay and lesbian" movie is notable. I don't think it's entirely her fault, though. Movies focusing on the lives of homosexuals are vastly unpopular and under advertised, and she simply has not been exposed to the genre. Besides Brokeback Mountain, I believe Pariah was the first "gay" film I have ever seen. I simply don't think about that subcategory of movies. When I asked my friend about my hypothetical movie, she was caught off guard. It was a weird question and topic we don't typically think about.
So w
here does my friend's argument fall through? And why are LGBTQ focused movies so taboo amongst the average person? Are they really that difficult to relate to, or does society shape us to see things in a certain light, regardless of our personal beliefs?      

Should We Really Be Trying to Deconstruct Gender?

Ever since I began my journey into feminist/queer theory my freshman year, I have viewed the category of gender as an enemy. I saw the ways this construct has a negative impact on everyone - constraining the actions of men and women into rigid categories, convincing us that our gender must match our biology, telling us that there are only two gendered ways to be in the world. I hated everything about gender, seeing only its oppressive forces against us all. One of the theorists who first began to break apart the idea of gender for me was Judith Butler. Her gender performativity theory displayed the ways that gender is constructed, worn, and acted out in life. It made me realize the ways that gender was liberating - that we control our own actions and thus can decide do whatever we want with gender - but then reminded me of how society constrains our opportunities and punishes our performative failures. Queer theory's proposed solution to this is to deconstruct the category of gender. If gender is oppressive and socially constructed, then it is possible to stop the oppression by taking apart this category. I went around believing this for quite some time, until I started thinking more closely about the topic last semester.

As most of you know, last semester there was a panel discussion about race and whether it has any usefulness as a category. A lot of the discussion at this panel was about the undeniable effect of race on our lives despite its social constructedness. The panel and the room came almost unanimously to the same idea - that race cannot be deconstructed as a category unless it stops having a real effect on our lives, as this deconstruction would only be erasure.

While race and gender work in very different ways that I am still figuring out, this started my thoughts about whether I really thought gender should be deconstructed. I came across a critique of Butler's performativity theory by a trans person named Cos who did not feel that Butler's theory validated trans identity. Butler famously says in Gender Trouble, "There is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender... Identity is performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that are said to be its results." However, most trans people distinguish between their gender identity and gender expression, where their expression "expresses" a deeply held gender feeling. In order for a trans person to desire so much to transition, there has to be something more to their identity than performance. I wrote my paper about this, and the conclusion I came to is that Butler can ignore the identity piece because she is cisgender. Because her gender identity and expression align, Butler can imagine that gender is not a central part of others' identity. (This is similar to the ways that white people can think they don't have a race and thus advocate for colorblindness.) Peformativity requires that people perceive one's gender in a particular way for one to be that gender, and thus it removes people's agency to self-define. It is especially violent when cisgender people are almost always these perceivers, since we operate in the cisgender hegemonic gender binary, and thus non-binary gender will almost never be perceived correctly. If we try to deconstruct gender, this will only remove more agency from people to self-identify and further erase their identities under a structure of cisgender domination.

Because transgender and genderqueer people's identities are invalidated by the idea of deconstructing gender, I propose that we should instead advocate for gender flexibility. Everyone should be able to self-define their gender and express it in any way that they want. This will require tearing down this system of cisgender hegemony. Fuck the cis-tem!

Realism and Intersection

            In class, Dr. J asked us if we thought that this story was much different than a story about a white teenager coming out, and I’d like to discuss that more. At first I thought it wasn’t that different – many of the other aspects of this movie, like marital problems, happen across races. However, I think Pariah differs significantly from comparable white stories in two ways, namely the issues of intersecting oppressions and its lack of romanticization.

            Oftentimes in bildungsroman stories with white characters, whether focused on LGBTQ issues or not, are shown through a hazy lens that glorifies being a teenager. Many of them are set in the summer and involve amusement parks and/or jobs with eccentric characters, and are neatly resolved at the end – see Edge of Seventeen and The Way Way Back. While these movies are nice and fun and make coming out and other issues easy to swallow, the realism Pariah provides is important for people who are really dealing with these issues, and it does so without sacrificing humorous moments or good writing. In class, someone expressed that they felt this could be based on a true story, and from Alex’s post we can see that it is indeed semi-autobiographical.
           The intersection of race, gender, and class with sexual orientation also sets Pariah apart. While it’s certainly not impossible to have a movie about a white working-class teen coming out, I have yet to see this representation. Laura’s struggle with bills as well as the representation of young Black female sexuality in different aspects are very important representations that needed to be added to the conversation. Lupita Nyong’o has spoken many times about how seeing Black women in movies made her believe for the first time that she could be an actress. This is only one example of the hope media representation can give people, and it is likely that Pariah has reaffirmed validity and a sense of community for people who face multiple intersecting oppressions.

            Has anyone seen any coming out films about a white character who is disabled, poor, or has other intersecting oppressions? Is Pariah the first of its kind? Do you think this more realistic portrayal is important or is the John Green genre just as valid?

     

The Intent of Oppression

I understand Frye's definition of oppression as a "network of forces and barriers which are systematically related and which conspire to the immobilization, reduction, and molding of [the oppressed group] and the lives [the oppressed group] lives" (44); however, should we also include "to systematically privilege the oppressors"?

I believe intent is left out of Frye's original definition. (While she acknowledges that these systems exist to benefit the oppressor groups, she does not emphasize it). By including this clause, the superordinate majority's interests are brought to consciousness. An abstract structure no longer purposelessly subjects the subordinate minority. Sexism does not simply diminish women's influence -- it constructs the patriarchy. Racism is not limited to the violence against people of color -- it establishes white supremacy. Oppression creates white privilege, male privilege, cis privilege, etc. This promotes a more cogent analysis of oppression in which we recognize that oppression benefits oppressors and exists to benefit oppressors.

This argument is teleological. It asserts that racism exists because it provides whites with social, economic, and political resources. Not emphasizing this dilutes the relation of the oppressor to the system and undermines why the system perpetuates itself.

It also allows one to see an increased variety of ways to fight against systems of inequality, for explicitly recognizing beneficiaries promotes the visibility of privilege, which we are socialized against seeing.  For instance, when discussing race, focusing only on the oppression people of color face permits white people to remain ignorant on how race affects them. White peoples’ racial existence escapes unacknowledged.  Focusing on how racism establishes white supremacy, however, subverts that. The invisibility becomes revealed.  Locking car doors when a black man walks by not only positions the black man as dangerous but also connects the person who locks the car to the network that provides whites with additional social, political, and economic resources. Discussing this as an incidence contributing to white supremacy thus marks the unmarked category of white; White signals safe. Therefore, to effectively fight sexism, a male should both address the actions that marginalize women, such as public acts of sexual harassment, as well as actions that promote male privilege, such as men’s increased tendency to interrupt.
  
I do not mean that that people individually oppress with intent. For example, most people who commit microaggressions -- myself included -- do not call themselves racists, sexists, or homophobes. However, this states that all oppressors have a vested interest in not acknowledging systems of oppression. For example, a reason especially white folk do not want to acknowledge the fallacy of color blindness is that it promotes our interests in not acknowledging it. However, it is a systematic intent embedded in the oppression and not an individual intent. This hidden element of intent explains why even women perpetuate sexism, for example. Focusing then on this interest and how it creates privilege allows one to see this.

Perfomativity in "Pariah"

As I pointed out during our brief discussion of Pariah at the end of class on Thursday, I felt that writer and director Dee Rees did an effective job of presenting the three different worlds that Lee has to navigate throughout the course of the film.

Rees is able to do this through a number of different techniques, but I think one of the most salient is that of Lee’s changing wardrobe as she moves from one to the other. This relates closely to Butler’s general notions of gender performativity as well as Halberstam’s more specific analysis of butchness.

Because of this, I thought it would be interesting to do a slight breakdown of the significance of Lee’s three general styles as they exist in her three worlds: her home, with Laura, and with Bina.

Laura:

We first see Lee presenting her gender in a very masculine way when she goes out to Laura, to the strip club and elsewhere hoping to attract women. Rees does an effective job of portraying the dichotomy between Lee wanting to fit in with Laura because she identifies with her, but not quite being comfortable with the performativity that entails (eg, the strap-on).

Audrey:

Lee’s gender presentation at home, particularly in the presence of her mother, feels especially forced throughout the film. This is deliberately shown through the Lee and Audrey’s interactions, like when Audrey comments on the pink shirt that “accents her figure” or when she asks Lee to tuck in her blouse before church. The struggle between them over Lee’s gender presentation isn’t one sided, as displayed by Audrey’s genuine internal struggle over the blouse that she buys for Lee but constantly second-guesses.

Bina:

At the beginning of their arranged friendship, Lee is still presenting in a more toned-down verison of her masculine performance as we see with Laura. However, as their relationship becomes more intimate and they spend more time together, she plays down her butchness and wears more colorful shirts as well as scarves so as to present herself to Bina in a more favorable (and feminine light).

Overall, I found this small but consistent variation in Alike’s character to be emblematic of her struggle across her different social lives. Performativity exists as such a fundamentally flawed aspect of gender expression and Alike’s variations show how even multiple different gender performances can fail to adequately display one’s gender identity and sexual expression to any specific group of people.

Do No Harm: Stop Infant Genital Surgery

Being a little let's call it resourceful: this week's post is an excerpt from my paper. If you're interested in the psychology of early genital surgery or how male circumcision might weigh in on this argument, here you are: 

Often, the first response to a baby being born is two questions: 1) is it healthy? and 2) is it a boy or a girl? For perhaps 1.7% of newborns, the answer to the latter is not obvious and causes significant distress for the parents. Before a now-controversial publication by John Money in 1955, society was unsure of what to do in these situations – if anything even needed to be done. His essay, “Hermaphroditism: Recommendations concerning assignment of sex, change of sex, and psychological management” established the standard practices by which many physicians still operate today, claiming that early sex assignment – often achieved by genital correction surgery – is the key to maximizing the likelihood of a successful gender identity formation. Just recently, however, as the children directly affected by Money’s encouragement to perform genital surgery have become adults, are we beginning to question this suggested practice.

In her essay “Should There Only Be Two Sexes?” Anne Fausto-Sterling, a professor of Biology and Gender Studies at Brown University, questions the practice of genital surgery asserted by Money: “However well-intentioned, the methods for managing intersexuality, so entrenched since the 1950’s, have done serious harm” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 125). Indeed, she argues for a redefinition of our binary sexed world and offers new guidelines on how doctors should handle intersexuality. Following careful consideration of the competing claims of Money and Fausto-Sterling and the examination of psychological evidence provided by Slijper’s et al. (1998) study, I argue that early genital surgery should not be performed in cases of neonate genital ambiguity.

Fausto-Sterling’s claim that “medicine’s focus on creating the proper genitals, meant to prevent psychological suffering, clearly contributes to it” was not enough to satisfy me (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p.128). Without any specific evidence of the psychological studies to which she refers, I could not fully accept her argument, so I located a research study that she references by Slijper et al. in 1998. It describes the investigation of 59 children with a physical intersex condition over a ten-year period. A team of healthcare professionals, spanning several disciplines, at Sophia’s Children Hospital in The Netherlands sought to prevent the development of cross-gender identification in this sample of intersex children. To this aim, newborns were each assigned a sex and were surgically modified to fit that sex within the first year of life. Following surgery, the children and their parents participated in psychotherapy for the duration of the study in accordance with John Money’s guidelines for treating intersex patients.

The researchers investigated the rates of the development of general psychopathology, gender identity disorder, and gender behavior deviance. Not surprisingly, the children seemed to cope more successfully when they displayed a flexible and resilient personality. Despite this and Money’s supposition that early genital surgery increases life satisfaction, 39% of the children developed severe general psychopathology including depressive neurosis and anxiety as determined by diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-IV. Additionally, 13% of the girls exhibited gender identity disorder (GID). While these results indicate that early counseling and parental support seem to have some preventive effect, psychopathology and GID still developed at higher-than-average rates in the children, which should implicate some doubt for the efficacy of surgical treatment of intersex children.

 “We protest the practice of genital mutilation in other cultures, but tolerate them at home” (Fausto-Sterling, 2000, p. 125). This bold comment from Fausto-Sterling prompted me to also think about the practice of male circumcision in light of the present argument. Canadian nurse and social advocate Kira Antinuk writes about what she calls forced nontherapeutic genital cutting in light of both intersex genital surgery and male circumcision, drawing riveting parallels between the two (Antinuk, 2013). She argues, like Fausto-Sterling does for infant genital surgery, that the practice of circumcision serves no physical or medical benefit and that performing such a procedure is in fact genital mutilation. Additionally, Antinuk posits that children should at the very least be granted the opportunity to choose to be circumcised, just as intersex children should have the opportunity to choose their gender upon reaching an appropriate age.

Can it be argued that early genital surgery in the case of intersex infants is forced nontherapeutic genital cutting? I think so. Like circumcision, the pretense of doing what is best for the child or conforming to social norms clouds our judgment and prevents us from seeing it that way. If these procedures were deemed medically necessary to save the child’s life or improve his/her physical well-being, then obviously medical steps should be taken to reach those ends. But that is not the case we are describing here. Still it seems that genital mutilation, which Western society finds deplorable, is occurring here at home more than we would like to know.  

Given this, it is imperative that we better understand the intricate interplay among mainstream Western society’s established gender norms, medicine’s role in condoning early genital surgery, and parents’ wish both to accept children as they are and to shape them in accordance with societal norms. The most conclusive way to do this is to empirically study these individuals; however, at present there exists no systematic comparison of long-term psychological outcomes between intersex individuals who did have early genital surgery and those who did not, making it difficult to reach a verdict on the efficacy of early genital surgery.

While there is no denying that the practice of genital surgery confirms the binary sex system we currently live in, questions about whether to enforce the binary at the expense of newborns by performing unnecessary surgeries on them may be less clear. The real shame in all this is that genital surgery has not even proven effective; in addition to the problems Fausto-Sterling raises, some women who have chosen genital surgery for intersex conditions as adults found that surgery, which was supposed to fix appearance and sexual function, failed to solve either of those problems. While this may be true, it is important to realize that medical professionals do not intend to harm; indeed, they do the opposite. It is just in this case that the once-accepted practice of infant genital surgery to correct a social (not medical) problem must be reevaluated. It seems that whether early genital surgery is performed or not, intersex individuals will face major identity and psychological crises later in life. Therefore, I am inclined to say that if intersex individuals incur similar psychological damage with or without infant genital surgery, then we should avoid the removal or alteration of organs the individual might later identify with. By allowing the child to remain biologically ambiguous, you allow her to decide her gender at an appropriate age without removing the biological organs that she might one day want. 

Everbody is a pariah.

The title of my blog post for this week is taken from an interview I found of Pariah director, Dee Rees. In her interview, Rees explains how Pariah is the story of her coming out experience. One of my favorite parts of the interview, and the film itself, is how unconcerned Rees is with her critics or with people who might be completely ignorant to the lives of LGBT people of color. The interviewer asks questions like, "Do you worry about people going in thinking the movie will be dark and melancholy, or do you like that they can be surprised by it?" and "What made it difficult to get your story out there?" The interviewer seems to expect Rees to discuss why she did not cater to a white, heterosexual audience when telling her story, but Rees simply says, "We didn't make the film to prove anybody wrong or spite anybody, it's just a story that needs to be told."

Rees is right about that. Personally, I had never seen a story like Alike's (Dee Rees, by extension) told in a major film production. While part of this lack of personal knowledge is the result of my own intellectual laziness (as Lorde says, it's not the job of oppressed people to teach their oppressors), the absence of queer people of color from popular culture is also to blame. It even took me several Google searches to find statistics about the absence of black LGBT individuals from the film and TV industries. Tragic. I did, however, find one article in The Root that sheds light on their abysmal lack of representation in the film industry. The article states, "The Los Angeles Times took an exhaustive look at the members of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences -- the voting body that decides what is, and perhaps more importantly what isn't, culturally legitimate film. The study found that of the 5,795-member body, 94 percent are white and 77 percent are male; only 2 percent are African-American and less than 2 percent are Latino. In other words, the industry is white and male."
This explains why movies like The Help are more apt to gain notoriety than realistic portrayals like Pariah.

Considering that LGBT people of color are rarely allowed cultural visibility on a large scale, Pariah is a breakthrough film on many levels. The film reveals the experiences of individuals who live in the space where race, gender and sexuality intersect. When discussing intersectionality, it is important to remember what Dr. J said in class today. Understanding queer people of color does not mean crediting them with "five more oppression points" because of the various facets of their identities that are marginalized by society. Considering people like Alike, the main character of the film, as "black and a female and a lesbian" would minimize her experience. She lives in the intersection of all three of these systems of oppression and we as viewers and as allies must comprehend how these forces interact to produce unique circumstances for people like Alike.

Needless to say, I am extremely grateful that we watched this film in class. I would love to hear others' reactions to Pariah and whether others have seen similar films. Additionally, I am curious about how others understood the intersection of race, gender and sexuality in the film. What do we gain by discussing intersectionality as opposed to deconstructing systems of oppression separately?

A Stance Against Porn Stars

My blog post will be in response to a previous post by Molly titled "Feminist Sex Workers," which links to an article from a Duke freshman porn star.  My post takes a different approach to viewing sex workers than the author took, so I thought it may merit its own post.

I would like to take an inflammatory stance.  While I agree with pretty much every statement the author says in her article with regards to how we view and treat sex workers (which is primarily what the article is concerned with), I would like to hold the position that most types of sex workers reinforce and further sediment patriarchal views by entering and engaging in the profession itself.  Thus, in the end I am condemning her actions as many of the inflammatory comments to the article did, albeit for different reasons. It is worth noting that I will be discussing only heterosexual sex, since this type of porn has the most widespread influence.  Yes, there are hundreds of subniches of porn that undermine my argument, but I think the "norm" of porn is very telling of the society it is embedded within.

My first argument is that sexual attraction and in turn kinkiness and other related categories are structurally influenced to a very high degree.  Of course there are exceptions such as facial symmetry and pheromones (scent) being good subconscious indicators of overall health and immunological diversity, respectively, but overall what is attractive is socially determined.  One does not need to do much past cultural research to find cultures that find unique aspects attractive: creating bodily morphisms (forehead shaping, neck elongation), being overweight, being cross-eyed, small feet, etc...  However, one aspect is commonly found attractive in patriarchal societies, namely a power dynamic, which continues to the bedroom.  This is very much exemplified and exaggerated in western porn.

Obviously (living in the patriarchy and all), this power dynamic consists of men being the dominant partners and the women being the submissive ones; again, I would like to reinforcing that this dynamic is not absolute in most cases of real sex but is strongly emphasized in western porn.  Furthermore, these ideas are propelled into everyday life and vice-versa.  Man up.  Grow a pair.  Be a man.  These are all phrases associated with not only competency but also the prerequisite for competency to take place within, namely control of a situation.  Being submissive in any group dynamic requires following orders given by the dominant to achieve the priorities the dominant has deemed important through controlling and understanding a situation, such as a boss/worker dynamic for example.  In porn, this dynamic is ingrained quite deeply, having the submissive woman primarily catering to the implicit orders (read desires) of the dominant man, namely his pleasure.  The submissive does not have agency to fulfill her own sexual desires and thus becomes "objectified," dehumanized, and a tool to appease the desires of the dominant, similarly to how heads of large corporations might view employees many ranks below them.

But how is this allowed?  Doesn't it violate so many of the principles of "equality" we cherish?  Well, precisely because porn primarily displays these women thoroughly enjoying being submissive.  This display of enjoyment creates a possibly false reality of these women having agency in achieving sexual pleasure and manifesting said agency by being submissive.  Being submissive is what they like.  Is this a true reality?  As previously stated, this bedroom power dynamic influences everyday life and vice-versa, causing its messages to become internalized.  So this may very well be a true reality to an extent, even if it is a learned one.  However, if we lived in a non-patriarchal society, I don't think this type of reality would be depicted.  I would be very hesitant to argue that submissive nature is intrinsic.  Thus, I would argue that mainstream porn implicitly imposes a power-dynamic that becomes internalized by its viewers, giving them a learned reality.

But who are the main viewers of porn?  Men.  It kind of makes sense why porn is depicted the way it is.  Porn after all is a commodity and corporations obviously maximize profits by catering to their demographic.  So this learned reality is given primarily to men.  These men then have certain tastes which must be met by the porn industry and so the cycle continues.  Under a patriarchy, this can be very problematic, considering that the class in power in any hierarchical system then imposes values on the rest of the system.

With the introduction of a globalized internet and the porn industry's capitalization of it, much of our youth achieves their first conceptions of sex and develops their respective notions of roles in the bedroom through porn.  The continued use and/or influence of porn continuing through adulthood only serves to sediment the posed realities given.  Furthermore, it has been extensively studied that long histories of exposure to porn desensitize individuals, primarily male, to sexual themes, forcing them to strive for more extreme themes (often times exaggerated power relations) to achieve previous levels of sensitivity (read: turned-on-ness). Since the widespread availability of free internet porn, this phenomenon can be further demonstrated through the rapid increase in acquired erectile dysfunction among young adults since real sexual encounters can no longer compete, often times because they are not extreme enough.

Yes, theoretically there should be no problems or moral sigma against becoming a sex worker.  However, sex workers enter the field as a profession; they want to make money.  How do you make money?  You cater to demand.  Unfortunately, demand in our society happens to be skewed away from a completely neutral way of viewing sex.  By engaging in the field and catering to general demand, a porn star unintentionally is reproducing everything feminism stands against.  I think the only way porn stars can partially avoid doing so is to exclusively perform his or her own individual sexual preferences.  I say partially because no one's view of what is attractive, sexy, or a turn-on can be independent of the influences society has ingrained in them throughout their lives.

I find that last statement to be the most troubling to me.  I really believe we generally have sexist turn-ons (to a degree) because some of them are learned.  But even if these turn-ons reproduce and further sediment oppressive structures, would it really be reasonable to deny individuals engagement in their sexual preferences and sexual fulfillment to create a better society for people tomorrow?  I believe Phong mentioned several classes ago the idea of banning (penetrative?) sex all together; I believe he had a similar view of sex in mind and was referring to a hypothetical means to achieving this goal.  But as we all know, this obviously is not reasonable.  I find this question to be in parallel with the butch argument against transsexuals: transsexuals do not truly transcend gender but rather redeem the traditional binary roles and maintain the system that both parties are oppressed within. So back we are to the original question posed in class (formulated a little differently).  How do we deal with the fact that perceived autonomy is not truly autonomous? Specifically how do we deal with the fact that any preference is mediated by and reproduces the context that said preference had genesis and development within?  In an ideal world, such preferences would not be an issue because the context would be neutral.  But in an oppressive context, such preferences are bound to be problematic.

Link: Managing disorder of sexual development surgically: A single center experience

http://www.indianjurol.com/article.asp?issn=0970-1591;year=2012;volume=28;issue=3;spage=286;epage=291;aulast=Kumar

Linked is a 2012 article that sheds light on the surgeries given to intersex children recently.  It also helps with clarifying some terms. However, we can see from the article that medical advancements has make it easier to achieve satisfactory both cosmetically and functionally in disorder of sexual development (DSD) surgeries. The process is not as harmful now as Fausto-Sterling described in the 90's. If in the end we finally find a way to "correct" intersex children to conform to genital binary, would we opt for the children to go through these surgeries if the best time to conduct these surgeries, as the article suggested, is before 2 years old, when the children are not aware of what gender and DSD means? If we choose yes, what does our choice mean?

A quote from the article makes clear its antagonism against the utopian policy supported by intersex activists. While the optimal gender policy assumes socialization as the formative force in gender identity development, it does not recommend early genital surgery if the social sexual identity is acquired later in life than at 2 years of age. Is the article misrepresenting the constructionist view of gender identity?

"For the past 50 years practice has been informed by the so-called optimal gender policy, which proposed that in ambiguous genitalia, gender assignment should be that which allows optimal psychosexual and psychosocial functioning later in life. ^[8] This approach assumes the socialization is the decisive factor in gender identity development. In practice to support the assigned gender, early feminizing or masculinizing surgery of external genitalia was recommended, as socially acquired sexual identity is established by the age of 2 years. ^[The optimal gender policy has been challenged; in particular, the underlying assumption that gender identity is socially constructed. Parents are now routinely advised that children have the right to full details about their diagnosis and the medical and surgical management of this. Evidence suggests that parents have significant fears about the impact of ambiguous genitalia ad disclosure of diagnosis on their child's development. They are often uncertain about what to say and fear child will blame them or develop psychological difficulties.

Feminist Sex Workers

If you haven't seen this article written by a freshman at Duke who also happens to be a porn star, I would suggest you check it out. She raises some interesting points about how our society treats female sexuality.

Personal Pronouns

When we read Judith Halberstam's (Jack Halberstam's) work "Transgender Butch: Butch/FTM Border Wars and The Masculine Continuum," there was a small amount of controversy (but enough to catch my attention) about Halberstam's personal pronoun.
  I could not find any information on whether or not Halberstam identified as a male when he wrote the essay of his that we read, so if someone has any knowledge on that, please let me know. During class, we weren't sure what pronoun to use for Halberstam. I feel that if somebody identifies as a man, you use "he/his" no matter what point of time in his life you are addressing. Other opinions are welcome in the comments! I looked up Halberstam on Wikipedia (advanced, I know) and found this quote "[I try] not to police any of it. A lot of people call me he, some people call me she and I let it be a weird mix of things and I'm not trying to control it." I found this interesting because I feel that I would insist on my preferred personal pronoun. My question is this: if Halberstam identified as a woman when he wrote the piece we read, should we use the pronoun "she" while talking about the piece, or should we use the pronoun "he" to recognize the way he identifies now? Even if Halberstam did identify as a man at the time, I would like to know everyone's opinion on the pronoun we should use if he identified as a woman at the time.

A Fourth Parallel Universe!... Just Kidding (But Not Really)

In class this week Dr. J responded to part of the conversation about Elyse's universe by stating that it would be likely that most people, in a world in which everyone is born ambiguously sexed, would recognize that gender and sex are social constructs. I responded with a doubt, and I'd like to delve a little deeper into that doubt in this blog post.

Firstly, as I said in class, I don't think that the possibility that once a person picked their gender, people would retroactively assign a "natural" cause for whatever selection he or she or (n/a) picked. In my experience studying the history of race and racial conflict, especially within the United States, the case has often been that portions of society view things like the correlation between being a minority and going to prison or having lower test scores empirically; this generally involves a lack of sophisticated reflection on past circumstances and their subsequent power structures. Is it hypocritical if I chalk this down to human nature?

Put more simply, is it ridiculous to think that it is human nature to wrongly assign race/gender stereotypes to human nature? Seems kind of ironic...

Regardless, especially considering Elyse's universe as one that starts tomorrow with all of our current social structures intact (I'm not actually sure if that detail was ever laid out in class), I feel quite confident that people would continue to essentialize gender, even in the face of the new overwhelming and overt evidence that it is merely a socially created category.

Obviously there would be a difference if, perhaps, we considered Elyse's project in terms of race. Basically, children would be born into our world (with all of its unique racial hierarchies and whatnot) would be some sort of brownish median color. Then, with no health consequences, they are allowed to pick the racial/ethnic group that they want to join. This is a little more complicated than picking a sex, but you get the idea: hair, eye color, skin color, average height, etc. would morph into something within the recognizable range of whichever group the person picks.

Wait... this might not make sense. I think I will appeal to the comment section to help flesh out my race-based version of Elyse's universe- if such an idea is possible without contradicting everything we know about the genetic fallacies of race. Elyse! Do you think this is possible? If it is, I think it could be a useful tool for better understanding the hypothetical universes that we constructed on Thursday.

Going off of Phong's Point - it's everybody's problem that our lives are less worth living

Is the life of a gender ambiguous person less worth living?

According to Phong, if we admit that we want to opt out of having intersex children when we could, then we are prejudiced against intersex people.  I agree with Phong. We do, in our culture, consider the life of an intersex child less worth living.

Dr. J’s argument against this is that we don’t consider a person’s life less worth living than other people’s when that person could live just like everybody else with the help of modern medical technology. This analogy does not work because first, there is minimal psychological harm done when a person takes insulin pumps. There is little social prejudice against having diabetes (at least in comparison to being intersex); second, by choosing to take insulin, isn’t a diabetic patient already affirming that she considers a life with normal insulin level better than a life without? A gender ambiguous person who does not have genital conditions that harms his/her health sometimes would not really mind having sexual ambiguity. Medically, being intersex (without harm to health) does not make life less worth living; however socially, it definitely does. This is why most students would opt for Phong’s pill that “cures” intersex. The same goes for a beauty pill. If everyone could take a pill to be beautiful, I doubt many people would refuse to take that pill.  Being ugly is not medically harmful, but it is socially harmful in our culture. In the same way, being intersex is not medically bad, but it is socially bad. Who should we blame? Ourselves! We are the constructing pieces of our culture and it is our responsibility to make the culture friendly to all kinds of genital conditions (isn’t it ridiculous that we have this obsession with the ethics of the shape of genitals? Why is that even a thing?)

Whose problem is it that our life is less worth living?

I had trouble explaining to a friend about Fausto-Sterling’s suggestion to change the gender binary bias in our social system rather than to change the people to conform to gender binary. My friend insisted that “if people are not comfortable in their bodies, it’s their problem”. I wanted to say that the discomfort in our bodies is socially forced upon us; however the transgender issue makes this point hard to make. If gender binary is socially constructed, why is that there are people with female bodies claiming that they need the other body? This is because the socially constructed selves are more important than our biological selves in defining who we are. Our gender-binary culture exaggerates the role of biological differences in determining gender differences so much that a person with one social self feels uncomfortable in his/her biological self and would like to change it to match his social self.

If I were to imagine myself to be a boy and pretendthat I have a penis despite being biologically female. It would be especially hard and I would considered sex reassignment surgery seriously. However, I would not want to be physically altered because of the expense and complications that come with the surgeries. I wouldn't think that the biological sex of my body matter so much in defining who I am. Appearance of a male or female serves other people in determining who I am, and it’s not my responsibility to appear one way or the other. We know that as social animals, our socially constructed self is much more important than our biological self in determining who we are. Therefore I have made it a part of my mission to not make assumptions on other people’s selfhood based on their apparent biology and gender-presentation.  I hope my friends would start doing this as well.

Modes of Identification: Analysis of a Fausto-Sterling Quote

                Using the following quote as motivation for this post, Anne Fausto-Sterling connects gender and sex to legal identification:

“Given the discrimination and violence faced by those whose cultural and physical genitals don’t match, legal protections are needed during the transition to a gender-diverse utopia. It would help to eliminate the “gender” category from licenses, passports, and the like. The transgender activist Leslie Feinberg writes: ‘Sex categories should be removed from all basic identification papers—from driver’s licenses to passports—and since the right of each person to define their own sex is so basic, it should be eliminated from birth certificates as well.’ Indeed, why are physical genitals necessary for identification? Surely attributes both more visible (such as height, build, and eye color) and less visible (fingerprints and DNA profiles) would be of greater use.”

As Fausto-Sterling understands sex, genitals, sex categories, etc… Fasuto-Sterling’s implicit point—that genitals and sex are not ideal means of identification—appears largely a justified one. On further thought, I think the point still stands. However, I think more clarity in what is intended by “identification,” and “sex categories” is need to shed light on the point being made.

                It seems that identification is usually thought of in two different modes, and it is my opinion that Fausto-Sterling intends both modes in the previous quote.

1.  Personal Identification or the Qualitative mode of identification – This kind of identification is concerned with more deeply philosophical and existential aspects of one’s being. The terms and ideas use to describe one’s identity in this respect are usually more abstract, less concrete, and with room for variability some particulars. Here, emphasis is placed on abstract individuality.
   
2. Impersonal Identification­ or the Quantitative mode of identification or “Police” identification – This kind of identification appeals to measurable aspects of one’s being. Things such as height, weight, eye color, etc… are examples of quantitative identity. The terms and ideas used here are usually concrete, and they usually refer to things that are considered physical facticity. The purpose of such identification is usually recognition of the physical appearance of an individual. 

With regard to the quantitative mode of identification, Fausto-Sterling’s point makes complete sense. Such physical-facticity-aspects of one’s being that are not regularly apparent or visible to others—let alone society—should be considered useless aspects with which to recognize an individual. The mere fact that physical genitals and “cultural genitals” do not necessarily correspond should make this aspect of one’s quantitative mode of identity insufficient. Couple this with the fact that it is certainly not that case that anyone—officers of the law—could go around and demand the revelation of another’s genitals or sex, then it should be apparent that such a quantitative measure of one’s identity is insufficient for the purposes of recognition. Therefore, this aspect—one’s genitals or sex—fails to meet the purpose for which it was deemed relevant in the first place.

                With regard to the qualitative mode of identification, things become vastly more complex.  With respect to physical objects, it is the individual’s interpretation or perception of the object that makes it relevant to their personal identity. Here, Fausto-Sterling argues—in my terms—that there is a misunderstanding and an unjustified synthesis of the two modes of identification. In this case, the object is associated with a cultural impression, a qualitative sense of identity. This connection is purely artificial, and therefore can be changed. Fausto-Sterling argues that this connection is actually, totally incoherent since the important information we think we gain by knowing the presence of a physical object—genitals or sex in this case—is actually not connected to the object nor is it reflective of it. So her argument goes beyond the mere distinction I have presented.

                When it comes to “sex categories” I believe the Fausto-Sterling intends a meaning that convolutes the two kinds of identification and implies a connection between them as necessitated.

Though the ideas and connections made in this post have been presented by the other author’s we have read, Fausto-Sterling does not explicitly adopt these ideas, definitions, and connections. It is not even clear if Fausto-Sterling even acknowledges a conceptual problem with regard to identification (at least to me, please correct me if I am mistaken).  As a result, her argument may be glossed over or interpreted incorrectly. 

follow the white rabbit (?)

In class on Thursday we entered into a pretty fascinating thought experiment, which I suppose we can call the Morpheus Problem. The thought experiment posited three possible worlds in which sexuality is ascribed via birth. The first world, Phong’s world, is one in which each individual can take a pill that entails their offspring will be sexed according to the exact binary. The second world, my world (long live the queen), is one in which each individual may take a pill so that their offspring is definitively born with ambiguous genitalia. The third option is to remain in the world we current inhabit, and leave the sexing of our offspring, whether binary conformant or ambiguous, up to what looks more like chance.

Schaeffer brought up an interesting thought, which is what I was originally intending as the result of the production a reframed world that is complementary to that of Phong’s. Schaeffer pointed out that those who, in my world, who chose one biological sex ascription might be marginalized from those who maintain their ambiguous sexual biology in the same way that sexually ambiguous individuals are marginalized in a society where one congruent sex is the norm. When I originally formulated the world in contrast to Phong’s, I did so with the intent of demonstrating that the reframed issue which embodies a rejection of binary at the foundational biological level could still lead to the discrimination according to binary we see in both Phong’s example and the world as it is now.

The reason I thought this alternate framing of Phong’s possible world would result in the same marginalization of the out-group was due to phenomena like displacement aggression (which in this case would translate into displacement binary), the effects of language on social structuring, and the effects by other facets of identity which are related to, but distinct from, sexual identity (which is itself related to but distinct from biological sex). It seems that changing only the sexual binary at the biological level may not have as large an effect upon binary concepts and preferences if the language that we use to discuss sex and sexual identity do not change. We have only, instead, turned the usual system of norms on its head, without changing the descriptive patterns associated with norm conformity, such as oppression and its related “–isms”.

But it may be that gender binary is the original binary from which we frame a linguistic system. Dr. J. pointed out that it is possible for us to, without much difficulty, in my world revert to the usage of androgynous pronouns, and reference individuals utilizing nominate nouns alone… like using “Hannah” only to describe or refer to our friend “Hannah.” If the male/female sexual distinction is the most fundamental of our binary terms, then the disruption of this most essential binary would bring into question the rest of the binary terms we had once taken for granted.

Counter to this assertion is the fact that our other (English) binary terms, while by definition are supposed to function as opposites, function rather as the presence and lack of some attribute that the concept represents. Although both opposites and binaries present concepts in terms of a relationship or dynamic, the relationship expressed in either are not necessarily the same. Whereas opposites are supposed to balance or represent two diametric concepts, most binary terms do not fit this description. Opposites like on/off, left/right, far/near and top/bottom are not representative of the lack of the other, while binaries like male/female, full/empty, hot/cold, and light/dark are conceptualized in terms of one term lacking the quality expressed by the other. In order to become less black and white (ha ha, binary or opposite terms?) about ascribing attributes to individuals, we would have to align our understanding of binary with the conceptual difference demonstrated by the above mentioned opposites.

So the question remains, does the removal of biologically determined binary entail a general restructuring of binary into a more gradient or dynamic understanding of its related attributes, such that marginalization is less likely to occur? Or does the fact that diametric types are by nature relational entail that we search for stark opposition in order to conceptualize them? The answer to that question pretty much answers the question as to whether or not my world is distinct from Phong’s, and thus which would be better to choose.