Friday, February 7, 2014

Butler's Notion of Gender? Or General Identity?

                Our discussion of gender has lead us into discussions of identity.  Identity of the individual quickly makes the jump to existential inquiries. Once such conceptual territory is breached, we realize that so much of the world around is taken as granted. When I say “granted” I mean granted in the sense that it is indubitably true, real, concrete, unchangeable, and, in a sense, essential.  It would be clearer if I borrowed Sartre’s term “facticity.” Questions like:  Am I really a soccer player? Am I really a trumpet player? Am I really a man? Am I really the thing I take myself to be? Namely, Pierce. What does it mean to be a Pierce? We take so much to be facticity, but from my vantage point—when analysis is actually done and what it means to be is more thoroughly clarified—it seems that nearly we all we take to adhere to the realm of facticity simply should not be placed in that category.

                Butler proposes that gender is purely a performance, but a performance that gives rise to the view of itself as something essential. To what else could this idea be held up as an explanation for? Many things we know in relation to some category that may well be a socially constructed category concealed by a notion of essence.

                Another relevant idea—and I will attribute it to Sartre because I learned of it through his texts—is the idea of “setting a project for oneself.” My understanding of Sartre’s understanding of existentialism is that the existence of the human being precedes its essence. That is, the human being possesses no essence or that its essence is nothingness. The idea of “setting a project for oneself” is the idea that we are not actually anything we claim to be in the sense that some material object like an inkwell is. For example, if I claim to be a waiter, I am not actually a waiter in essence, but I am setting for myself the project of acting, behaving, and being as a waiter. I could always choose to transcend that “role” and assume another “mode” of being—mode of being in the sense described in relation the project of being a waiter.

                When I say that I am Pierce (some Identity), then, I am only setting for myself the project of being  this identity. This is an extremely interesting idea.  In the assertion, “I am Pierce,” I am implying an individuality of the self. That is, no one else can set for themselves the project of being me. Also, “I” am not a clearly defined thing. That is, my traits and attributes do change over time. Everything about myself, in some sense, is then rendered the sort of performance that also defines the constitution of myself. I am being what I am and what I am is only so by virtue of the actions that contribute to what I am. If that seems a bit confusing, I intend to claim that our identities hold a similarity to Butler’s description of gender. It seems an appropriate connection since gender is concept we use to identify ourselves and others.


Just some interesting ideas. 

3 comments:

  1. Pierce,

    In reading your discussion of Sartre's "setting a project for oneself," and how no one else can set for themselves "the project of being Pierce" because that project necessarily implies individuality, I am reminded of Judith Butler's idea that when performing gender, actors are always reading from a preexisting script. She writes, "The body is not passively scripted with cultural codes, as if it were a lifeless recipient of wholly pre-given cultural relations. But neither do embodied selves pre-exist the cultural conventions which essentially signify bodies. Actors are always already on the stage, within the terms of the performance."
    In the context of your analysis, wouldn't this mean that, because your "project of being Pierce" consists of performing numerous cultural conventions, another person could, in fact, set for themselves "the project of being Pierce"? To your point, Butler does concede that "the script" may be enacted in various ways, but aren't those ways necessarily finite and limited? Therefore, isn't it conceivable that someone somewhere could be piecing together the same various cultural conventions that constitute your identity?

    Interested to hear your thoughts.

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  2. My understanding of the quote you provided is that Butler believes that neither is there some pre-existing cultural essence of the gender of a person, nor do bodies themselves pre-exist the cultural conventions that they find themselves in. I think Butler's point here--and this is developed later on in her text--is that we are not genetically scripted, but that we are compelled by cultural norms to conform to certain prescriptive genders developed prior to the existence of our bodied selves.

    The subject of individuality I brought up complicates things, and I am not entirely sure how to view it. It would seem to me that our normative sense of identity would not allow for others to set for themselves the project of not being themselves. To "not be oneself" seems an impossibility. I understand the sense in which you are using the "setting a project for oneself," and it seems reasonable to claim that someone else could easily set for themselves the project of being another person, another individual identity. So there is an issue here, and it appears that your objection has some justification. There is nothing preventing someone else from setting for themselves the project of being another in the sense of "trying" to do so. However, I am not certain that they could actually be other than their own self.

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  3. I think that you made a great connection to Sartre's "Bad Faith" and identity. Correct me if you think that I am off base on his ideas because I have not read Sartre in a couple of years.

    According to Sartre, performative gender roles would be considered as acting in bad faith. This is not an authentic identity brand. However, if we are to accept that it is impossible to escape this made up identity, then is everybody always acting in bad faith?

    For instance, if we are always performing according to our binary gender, then is it possible that this identity crisis has been in the making since the day that you were born? In other words, your own individual identity is indeed not even your own. Everything that you can claim to be part of your identity has been nurtured into you, especially gender. This is important only in the sense that when it comes to gender, you cannot escape this performance and we are always acting accordingly.

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