In class on Thursday we entered into a pretty fascinating
thought experiment, which I suppose we can call the Morpheus Problem. The thought experiment posited three possible
worlds in which sexuality is ascribed via birth. The first world, Phong’s
world, is one in which each individual can take a pill that entails their
offspring will be sexed according to the exact binary. The second world, my
world (long live the queen), is one in which each individual may take a pill so
that their offspring is definitively born with ambiguous genitalia. The third
option is to remain in the world we current inhabit, and leave the sexing of
our offspring, whether binary conformant or ambiguous, up to what looks more
like chance.
Schaeffer brought up an interesting thought, which is what I
was originally intending as the result of the production a reframed world that
is complementary to that of Phong’s. Schaeffer pointed out that those who, in
my world, who chose one biological sex ascription might be marginalized from
those who maintain their ambiguous sexual biology in the same way that sexually
ambiguous individuals are marginalized in a society where one congruent sex is
the norm. When I originally formulated the world in contrast to Phong’s, I did
so with the intent of demonstrating that the reframed issue which embodies a
rejection of binary at the foundational biological level could still lead to
the discrimination according to binary we see in both Phong’s example and the
world as it is now.
The reason I thought this alternate framing of Phong’s
possible world would result in the same marginalization of the out-group was
due to phenomena like displacement aggression (which in this case would
translate into displacement binary), the effects of language on social
structuring, and the effects by other facets of identity which are related to,
but distinct from, sexual identity
(which is itself related to but distinct
from biological sex). It seems that changing only the sexual binary at the
biological level may not have as large an effect upon binary concepts and
preferences if the language that we use to discuss sex and sexual identity do
not change. We have only, instead, turned the usual system of norms on its
head, without changing the descriptive patterns associated with norm
conformity, such as oppression and its related “–isms”.
But it may be that gender binary is the original binary from
which we frame a linguistic system. Dr. J. pointed out that it is possible for
us to, without much difficulty, in my world revert to the usage of androgynous
pronouns, and reference individuals utilizing nominate nouns alone… like using
“Hannah” only to describe or refer to our friend “Hannah.” If the male/female
sexual distinction is the most fundamental of our binary terms, then the
disruption of this most essential binary would bring into question the rest of
the binary terms we had once taken for granted.
Counter to this assertion is the fact that our other (English)
binary terms, while by definition are supposed to function as opposites,
function rather as the presence and lack of some attribute that the concept
represents. Although both opposites and binaries present concepts in terms of a
relationship or dynamic, the relationship expressed in either are not
necessarily the same. Whereas opposites are supposed to balance or represent
two diametric concepts, most binary terms do not fit this description.
Opposites like on/off, left/right, far/near and top/bottom are not
representative of the lack of the other, while binaries like male/female,
full/empty, hot/cold, and light/dark are conceptualized in terms of one term
lacking the quality expressed by the other. In order to become less black and
white (ha ha, binary or opposite terms?) about ascribing attributes to individuals, we would have to align
our understanding of binary with the conceptual difference demonstrated by the
above mentioned opposites.
So the question remains, does the removal of biologically
determined binary entail a general restructuring of binary into a more gradient or dynamic understanding of its related attributes, such that marginalization is less
likely to occur? Or does the fact that diametric types are by nature relational
entail that we search for stark opposition in order to conceptualize them? The
answer to that question pretty much answers the question as to whether or not
my world is distinct from Phong’s, and thus which would be better to choose.
I think your points on linguistic categorizations and their respective implications are very important. From the examples given, I would like to group left/right, far/near, and male/female together as graded antonyms that don't produce intrinsic value judgments from their lack or presence of something. However, hot/cold, light/dark, and full/empty are graded antonyms that do produce such value judgment through their indication of presence; despite being graded antonyms by nature, they end up functioning as complementary antonyms from their implications on value. I leave on/off out because they are complementary antonyms by nature like push/pull. I would like to argue that value judgments are placed on the former group to indicate some level of utility in a social context. Another example in this category could be high/low or up/down. The direction of up doesn't intrinsically have more value but it was associated with God and given such positive value. Why do you think Europe cartographically placed itself in the upper half of the world? The globe could have been equivalentally viewed upside down. This process of valuing one extreme of a graded antonym creates a devaluation for its opposite. As previously states, I would argue that this valuation process causes the antonyms to be viewed as complementary with respect to value rather than graded. Why isn't this value judgement graded as well? I would say because it is viewed as either reasonably equivalent to the "highest" value or it is not.
ReplyDeleteSo all in all, I think the major problem comes in assigning value judgments to antonyms. The removal of a biologically determined binary would remove preconceived notions of value within the system. In response to Schaeffer's counter, I think biological sex ascription could be viewed as a stance in maturity, where assuming an ambiguous biological sex could be viewed as much of a stance as assuming a distinct biological sex; thus, choosing ambiguous biological sex would not be viewed as a maintenance of immaturity but rather as a unique and distinct progression. By viewing all biological sex decisions as distinct from a state of immaturity, choices might become more uniform, lessening marginalization.