Modes of Identification: Analysis of a Fausto-Sterling Quote

                Using the following quote as motivation for this post, Anne Fausto-Sterling connects gender and sex to legal identification:

“Given the discrimination and violence faced by those whose cultural and physical genitals don’t match, legal protections are needed during the transition to a gender-diverse utopia. It would help to eliminate the “gender” category from licenses, passports, and the like. The transgender activist Leslie Feinberg writes: ‘Sex categories should be removed from all basic identification papers—from driver’s licenses to passports—and since the right of each person to define their own sex is so basic, it should be eliminated from birth certificates as well.’ Indeed, why are physical genitals necessary for identification? Surely attributes both more visible (such as height, build, and eye color) and less visible (fingerprints and DNA profiles) would be of greater use.”

As Fausto-Sterling understands sex, genitals, sex categories, etc… Fasuto-Sterling’s implicit point—that genitals and sex are not ideal means of identification—appears largely a justified one. On further thought, I think the point still stands. However, I think more clarity in what is intended by “identification,” and “sex categories” is need to shed light on the point being made.

                It seems that identification is usually thought of in two different modes, and it is my opinion that Fausto-Sterling intends both modes in the previous quote.

1.  Personal Identification or the Qualitative mode of identification – This kind of identification is concerned with more deeply philosophical and existential aspects of one’s being. The terms and ideas use to describe one’s identity in this respect are usually more abstract, less concrete, and with room for variability some particulars. Here, emphasis is placed on abstract individuality.
   
2. Impersonal Identification­ or the Quantitative mode of identification or “Police” identification – This kind of identification appeals to measurable aspects of one’s being. Things such as height, weight, eye color, etc… are examples of quantitative identity. The terms and ideas used here are usually concrete, and they usually refer to things that are considered physical facticity. The purpose of such identification is usually recognition of the physical appearance of an individual. 

With regard to the quantitative mode of identification, Fausto-Sterling’s point makes complete sense. Such physical-facticity-aspects of one’s being that are not regularly apparent or visible to others—let alone society—should be considered useless aspects with which to recognize an individual. The mere fact that physical genitals and “cultural genitals” do not necessarily correspond should make this aspect of one’s quantitative mode of identity insufficient. Couple this with the fact that it is certainly not that case that anyone—officers of the law—could go around and demand the revelation of another’s genitals or sex, then it should be apparent that such a quantitative measure of one’s identity is insufficient for the purposes of recognition. Therefore, this aspect—one’s genitals or sex—fails to meet the purpose for which it was deemed relevant in the first place.

                With regard to the qualitative mode of identification, things become vastly more complex.  With respect to physical objects, it is the individual’s interpretation or perception of the object that makes it relevant to their personal identity. Here, Fausto-Sterling argues—in my terms—that there is a misunderstanding and an unjustified synthesis of the two modes of identification. In this case, the object is associated with a cultural impression, a qualitative sense of identity. This connection is purely artificial, and therefore can be changed. Fausto-Sterling argues that this connection is actually, totally incoherent since the important information we think we gain by knowing the presence of a physical object—genitals or sex in this case—is actually not connected to the object nor is it reflective of it. So her argument goes beyond the mere distinction I have presented.

                When it comes to “sex categories” I believe the Fausto-Sterling intends a meaning that convolutes the two kinds of identification and implies a connection between them as necessitated.

Though the ideas and connections made in this post have been presented by the other author’s we have read, Fausto-Sterling does not explicitly adopt these ideas, definitions, and connections. It is not even clear if Fausto-Sterling even acknowledges a conceptual problem with regard to identification (at least to me, please correct me if I am mistaken).  As a result, her argument may be glossed over or interpreted incorrectly.